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SCHOOLS-PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ADOPTS "BRIGHT-LINE"
TEST FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A REQUESTED SERVICE IS
A REQUIRED "RELATED SERVICE" UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F.
526 U.S. 66 (1999)
I. FACTS
When Garret F. was four years old, he sustained a severe spinal cord
injury in a motorcycle accident and consequently was paralyzed from
the neck down.' Because of Garret's paralysis, he was confined to a
wheelchair, which he operated via a puff-and-suck straw.2 While
Garret's physical abilities were drastically affected by the accident, his
mental capacities remained completely intact.
3
In addition to being wheelchair-bound, Garret required a ventilator
to assist with his breathing. 4 Since Garret is a paralyzed, ventilator-
dependent child, he required the following services during school hours:
urinary catheterization, suctioning of his tracheotomy tube, occasional
positioning changes, monitoring of and assistance with his ventilator
including any emergency situations, and assessment and observation for
autonomic hyperreflexia.5 Accompanied by a family member who
assisted him with those physical needs, Garret entered the Cedar Rapids
Community School District and participated in a regular classroom
educational setting.6
While Garret was a kindergarten student, his eighteen-year-old aunt
provided the physical care he required during school hours.7 Thereafter,
the family used settlement proceeds obtained from the accident, insur-
ance coverage, and other resources to provide for a licensed practical
nurse to attend to Garret's physical needs.8 In 1993, Garret's mother
1. See Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 69 (1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. A ventilator is a machine that assists with Garret's breathing, which Garret needs as
an external aid to breathe for him. See id. at 69 n.2.
5. See Petitioner's Brief at 4, Garret F. (No. 96-1793). Autonomic hyperreflexia is a
life-threatening condition that can occur in ventilator-dependent individuals, resulting from an
uncontrollable visceral reaction to such things as anxiety or a full bladder; when it occurs, this
condition requires immediate attention because it can result in a dysfunction of the body's vital signs.
See Garret F., 526 U.S. at 69 n.3.
6. See id. at 70.
7. See id.
8. See iL
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petitioned for the Cedar Rapids Community School District to take
responsibility for the costs of furnishing Garret's full-time attendant.9
In denying the mother's request for such services, the school district
stated that the requested services were "medical" in nature, which the
school district believed it was not obligated to provide.10
Since Garret's enrollment in the school district, he has received the
following services at no personal cost: an individualized educational plan
written by a multi-disciplinary educational team, regular classroom in-
struction, services of an education associate to assist him with movement
within the school and manipulation of his computer and texts, a
specialized computer with a corresponding mouth-stick control and
associated software, and special transportation to and from school.11 The
parties stipulated that the school district's least senior nurse earned
$37,000 in 1994, and it would cost at least $27,000 to hire a nurse to
provide Garret the care he needed during school hours. 12 Evidence also
indicated that even if the school district allowed the hired assistant to
perform both the education assistant's and the medical service
attendant's responsibilities, the overall cost would still remain between
$20,000 and $30,000 per year. 13 Finally, the school district argued that
it only employed six full-time registered nurses, a staffing size that did
not enable each school within the district to have a registered nurse on
site at all times.14
After the school district's denial to provide the continuous services,
Garret's mother requested a hearing before the Iowa Department of
Education, which was presided over by an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ).15 Garret's mother requested such a hearing, relying upon both
the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Iowa
state law to support her claim, yet most of the AL's discussion focused
upon the federal statute. 16 The ALJ initially addressed the school
9. See id
10. See Petitioner's Brief at 6, Garret F. (No. 96-1793).
11. See id at 4-5. The school district's educational associate was a licensed practical nurse;
however, she was not hired to attend to Garret's health-related needs. See id at 5. Rather, she simply
provided for his school-related needs and was reimbursed only for these services at an annual wage
of $9,500. See id.
12. See id. at 6. The school district argued that its school nurses do not routinely provide
continuous one-on-one care for other students. See id. Instead, it described school nursing duties to
include the following services: planning health service for children; attending meetings when children
have health concerns; supervising and training of secretaries and other staff who administer
medications, emergency first aid, and other intermittent care; providing health education in the
classroom; insuring safety; and checking student shot records. See id.
13. See id. at 6-7.
14. See id. at 6. In addition, the school district was not providing continuous one-on-one care for
any students enrolled within its jurisdiction. See id.




district's argument surrounding the cost of providing such services to
Garret by noting that there are no legally imposed spending limits
placed upon school districts regarding a disabled student.17 However,
the ALJ also indicated that if the school district incurred a special
education budget deficit by over-spending, it could obtain funds from
the district cash reserve or from the state itself.18 Therefore, the ALJ
held that "the District has identified and weighted Garret for funding
under state law."19 This concluded the AL's analysis regarding the
school district's argument that providing such "medical services" to
Garret would be an excessive financial burden upon the school district.20
The ALJ then addressed the argument surrounding the burden that
would be placed upon the school district if it were required to provide
continuous nursing services to Garret. 21 In response, the ALJ held that
even though the school district was not currently providing continuous
one-on-one services to any particular student, most of the services
required by Garret's condition were already being provided to other
school district students in some capacity. 22 The ALJ also took note of
the parties' disagreement over the licensure of the individual who
administered the care to students requiring such services. 23 The AIU
further noted that those providing such care in other parts of the country
ranged from non-licensed providers to fully licensed registered nurses.
24
The ALJ explained that "federal law requires that children with a
variety of health impairments be provided with 'special education and
related services' when their disabilities adversely affect their academic
performance." 25 The ALJ also determined "that applicable federal
17. See Respondent's Brief at 7, Garret F. (No. 96-1793).
18. See id.
19. Id. Based upon the AU's analysis of how the school district devises its special education
budget, he concluded that Garret's special needs were incorporated because the school district did not
place any limit upon expenditures for special education students in its fiscal plan. See id.
20. See id. at 7-8. The AU concluded that the IDEA required the school district to bear full
financial responsibility for the care Garret required, regardless of the cost, because there was no
spending limit in place pertaining to the administration of nursing services to a child under the IDEA.
See Garret F., 526 U.S. at 70.
21. See Garret F., 526 U.S. at 70.
22. See id. at 70. The ALI stated that other services being provided to other school district
students included: urinary catheterization, food and drink, oxygen supplement positioning, and
suctioning. See id. at 70 n.4.
23. See id at 70-71.
24. See id. at 71. The Iowa Board of Nursing provided a declaratory ruling which stated that
Garret's provider must be a licensed practitioner overseen by a registered nurse. See Petitioner's
Brief at 7, Garret F. (No. 96-1793). However, the AI questioned this conclusion because while at
home, Garret was attended by a licensed practical nurse without the supervision of a registered nurse.
See Respondent's Brief at 3 n.2, Garret F. (No. 96-1793). Subsequently, the Iowa Board of Nursing
revised its opinion, but the school district continued to maintain that it was obligated to provide a
registered nurse to attend to Garret's physical needs. See id. at 3.
25. Garret F., 526 U.S. at 71.
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regulations distinguish between 'school health services,' which are
provided by a 'qualified school nurse or other qualified person' and
'medical services,' which are provided by a licensed physician." 26 Fur-
thermore, the ALJ held that the "medical services" exclusion available
under the IDEA applies to those services that are for diagnostic or
evaluation purposes. 27 Instead of making the distinction between "relat-
ed services" and "medical services" based simply upon the title of the
service administrator, the ALJ ruled that the distinction also rests upon
particular services a physician is specifically trained to provide. 28 In
concluding his opinion, the ALJ ruled that the IDEA "required the
District to bear financial responsibility for all of the services in dispute,
including the continuous nursing services." 29
In reasoning that such services are within the IDEA's "related
services" definition, the ALJ sided with the school district and found no
legal authority for establishing a cost-based test in determining whether
"related services" are required. 30  Afterwards, the school district
challenged the AL's ruling in federal district court; however, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa upheld the AL's
ruling and granted summary judgment against the school district.31
The district court's decision was upheld by the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, which noted that as a recipient of federal funds under the
IDEA, Iowa had a statutory duty to provide Garret with a "free appro-
priate public education." 32 Such education included services that were
required to meet his physical needs, because they were supportive in
nature and therefore not excluded under the "medical services"
provision of the IDEA.33 The court interpreted the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Irving Independent School District v.
Tatro34 as providing a two-step analysis of the "related service"
definition established in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17). 35 First, the court must
26. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(a), (b)(4), (b)(1 1) (1998)).
27. See id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994)). The term "related services" includes medical
services "except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only ...."
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17). All references to the Unites States Code herein are to the 1994 version of
the United States Code, which was in effect at the time the dispute arose in Garret F.
28. See Garret F., 526 U.S. at 71.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 71 n.5.
31. See id. at 72.
32. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 106 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that continuous nursing service was a "related service" that the district was required to provide under
the statutory requirements of the IDEA, because it was supportive and not excluded as a medical
service), affid, 526 U.S. 66 (1999).
33. See id at 825.
34. 468 U.S. 883 (1984).




determine if a service is a "supportive service[ ] . . . required to assist a
child with a disability to benefit from special education." 36 If so, the
court then proceeds to the second step and determines if the service
meets the "medical service" exclusion.
37
When it applied this two-step analysis to Garret's situation, the court
of appeals determined that his services fell squarely within the "support-
ive services" definition, because without such assistance he would be un-
able to attend classes. 38 When the court applied the second step of the
analysis to Garret's situation, it concluded that the Tatro case established
a "bright-line" test.39 Under such test, the court reasoned that the ser-
vices of a physician, other than for diagnostic and evaluation purposes,
are not required to be provided by a school district under the "medical
services" component. 40 Yet, any services that can be provided in a
school setting by either a licensed professional or layperson are clearly
required to be provided by a school district under the "related services"
provision.41
The school district then proceeded to petition for certiorari, chal-
lenging only the second step of the two-step analysis used to interpret
the "related services" provision. 42 The school district asserted that some
federal courts applied a multi-factor test that considered the nature and
extent of the requested services instead of using a "bright-line" test in
which the analysis was strictly dependent upon the nature of the pro-
vider.43 However, the United States Supreme Court clearly adopted the
"bright-line" test that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals enunciated in
Tatro.44 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that Garret's services were
"related services," which the school district was required to provide, be-
cause they could be administered by personnel other than a physician.
4 5
36. Id.
37. See id. at 824-25.
38. See id. at 825.
39. See id. The medical services component within the "related services" definition requires the
administration of medical services for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(17) (1994); see also Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890.
40. See Garret F., 106 F.3d at 825.
41. See id. (citing Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890-96).
42. See Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 72 (1999).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 73.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA),46 thereby mandating that states provide "free
appropriate public education" to all disabled children.47 This Act was
later renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in
1990.48 Congress also established the Office of Special Education Pro-
grams within the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services
in the Department of Education.4 9 This office was established to ensure
the effective administration of the law; specifically, it charged the
Secretary of the Department of Education with carrying out the
provisions of the law by "issuing, amending, and revoking regulations
implementing the IDEA."50
However, there was confusion and disagreement over the language
included within the IDEA, which ultimately led to the application of two
different tests when determining whether a requested service is a covered
"related service" or an excluded "medical service" within the meaning
of the IDEA.51 This inconsistent interpretation stemmed from the
Supreme Court's decision in Irving Independent School District v.
Tatro.5 2 Initially, some courts interpreted Tatro as stating that if a non-
physician (nurse or layperson) could provide the service then it was a
covered "related service," but if a physician was required for the service
administration, then it was an excluded "medical service."5 3 Yet other
lower courts had interpreted Tatro as requiring an analysis of the nature
and extent of the service in question. 54 If the service is "intermittent,
simple, and cheap, then it is a covered related service, but if the service is
46. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (amending the Education of the Handicapped Act).
47. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, 774
(1975); see also Alison Barkoff, Comment, Revisiting De Jure Educational Segregation: Legal
Barriers to School Attendance for Children with Special Health Care Needs, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 135, 139 (1998) (analyzing relevant special education law, including the IDEA, the two tests
used to determine the related services provision of the IDEA, and the associated case law).
48. See Pub. L. No 102-119, 105 Stat. 587; see also Barkoff, supra note 47, at 141.
49. See 20 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1994).
50. Barkoff, supra note 47, at 142.
51. See Barkoff, supra note 47, at 137.
52. 468 U.S. 883 (1984) (affirming a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that because urinary
catheterization of a student with spina bifida could be performed by a school nurse or other qualified
personnel, it was a required related service under the IDEA and not excluded under the medical
services exception).
53. See Barkoff, supra note 47, at 137. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret
F., 106 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1997), affd 526 U.S. 66 (1999); Skelly v. Brookfield LaGrange Park Sch.
Dist. 95,968 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. IIl. 1997); Macomb County Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Joshua S., 715 F.
Supp. 824 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
54. See Barkoff, supra note 47, at 137. See, e.g., Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965
(6th Cir. 1995); Detsel v. Board of Educ., 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987); Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon
M., 787 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992).
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constant, complex, and expensive then it is an excluded medical
service."55 The United States Supreme Court chose to resolve the fifteen
years of inconsistency in the application of its Tatro decision by again
addressing the related services question in Cedar Rapids Community
School District v. Garret F.56
A. BACKGROUND ON THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION
ACT (IDEA)
The IDEA was an "ambitious" effort by Congress to promote the
educational interests of handicapped children. 57 The original legislation
enacted by Congress pertaining to the education of handicapped
children did not contain guidelines for state use of federally granted
money. 58 Instead, the legislation was simply a grant intended to assist
the states in the development and implementation of programs for
educating handicapped children. 59 In 1974, Congress increased federal
funding intending to require states to adopt "a goal of providing full
educational opportunities to all handicapped children." 60 This interim
legislation eventually led to the enactment of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, a title that was later changed to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).61 The primary
designated purpose of this legislation was to assure that all children with
disabilities have a free appropriate public education. 62 In order to facili-
tate the inclusion of such special education services, the IDEA requires
that the children have "related services" to meet their needs, that the
rights of children and their parents are protected, and that the states are
assisted in providing this special education. 63
Qualification for federal financial assistance under the IDEA occurs
when a participating state demonstrates that it has a policy in effect that
assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public
55. Barkoff, supra note 47, at 137.
56. 526 U.S. 66 (1999).
57. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982). Congress passed this legislation in
response to its perception that handicapped children were either totally excluded from schools or were
waiting until they were old enough to drop out of the educational system. See id
58. See id. at 180. Rowley explains that Congress first addressed the problem of educating the
handicapped in 1966 by amending the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. See id at
179-80 (citing Pub. L. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966)).
59. See id. at 180.
60. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 579, 583 (1974)).
61. See Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, 774 (1975); see also Barkoff, supra note 47, at 139-41.
62. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (defining the purpose of the IDEA); see also Barkoff, supra note 47,
at 141.
63. See Barkoff, supra note 47, at 141; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994).
2000]
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education. 64 The state must then submit this policy to the Secretary of
Education through a state plan describing the manner in which the handi-
capped children will be educated. 65
This "free appropriate education" should be tailored to meet the
specific needs of each child and be clearly specified in an individualized
educational program (IEP).66 In addition to the formulation of a
tailored IEP, the IDEA places extensive procedural requirements upon
states receiving federal funds, ranging from requiring notification be
given to parents or guardians pertaining to any change in the IEP to
requiring state administrative hearings for any aggrieved party. 67
Therefore, even though the IDEA leaves to the states the responsibility
for developing and executing the individual educational programs for
handicapped children, the legislation imposes significant requirements
that govern the execution of such responsibility. 68
Since the adoption of this legislation, the law's language has been
inconsistently interpretated. 69 The main problem stemmed from the
judicial analysis used to determine the type and extent of nursing
services that must be provided to disabled children. 70 The IDEA calls
for school districts to provide "related services" to disabled children if
needed to assist these children in benefiting from their public educa-
tion. 71 The IDEA lists certain services that are "related" in nature, but
this list is not considered to be exhaustive. 72 The only limitation placed
64. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1994) (stating that in order to qualify for assistance under this
subchapter, a state must demonstrate that it "has in effect a policy that assures all children with
disabilities the right to a free appropriate public education").
65. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1413 (1994).
66. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1994) (stating that the term "free appropriate public education"
means "special education and related services that . . . are provided in conformity with the
individualized education program").
67. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 182-83 (1982) (referring to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(20) and describing the elements that should be included in an IEP). The term "individ-
ualized education program" refers to a written statement for each disabled child developed in any
meeting by a representative of the local educational agency or unit qualified to meet the unique needs
of children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20) (1994). This statement shall include present
levels of educational performance of the child, annual goals, specific educational services to be
provided, the extent to which the child will be able to participate in regular educational programs, any
needed transition services for students beginning no later than age 16 and annually thereafter, the
projected date for initiation and duration of such services, and objective criteria and evaluation
procedures. See id.
68. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 183.
69. See, Barkoff, supra note 47, at 135-36 (referring to the judicial inconsistency in determining
the exact scope of the related services provision under the IDEA).
70. See Barkoff, supra note 47, at 137 (discussing the two different tests courts have used to
analyze the related service provision: the nature/extent test and the physician/non-physician test).
71. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994) (defining the purpose of the IDEA).
72. See generally Allan Osborne, Supreme Court Rules That Schools Must Provide Full-Time
Nursing Services for Medically Fragile Students, 136 EDUC. LAw REP. 1 (1999) (discussing the
background of the IDEA, analyzing previous case law interpreting the related services provision, and
providing a brief analysis of the Garret F. decision).
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upon what can be considered a "related service" is that any "medical
services" shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only. 73
Through the years, a gray area emerged in the interpretation of
what is considered a "related service" within the meaning of the
IDEA.74 Originating from Tatro, the lower courts had developed two
distinct tests in determining when such services were related in nature
and therefore required under the IDEA.75 However, there was also
significant case law preceding Tatro which shows the development of this
interpretative inconsistency among the federal circuits. 76
B. CASE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE IDEA
The first instance in which the United States Supreme Court was
called upon to interpret a provision of the IDEA was the 1982 case of
Board of Education v. Rowley. 77  In this decision, the Court discussed
the historical development of the IDEA and held that a deaf child, pro-
gressing in a regular classroom setting without difficulty, did not require
a sign language interpreter as a "related service." 78 The court further
held that the IDEA did not impose any obligation upon the states that
receive federal funding beyond the requirement that the handicapped
children receive specialized education. 79
In so holding, the Court clearly rejected the respondent's claim that
the goal of the IDEA was to provide each handicapped child with an
"equal educational opportunity." 80  Instead, the Court concluded by
ruling that the "basic floor of opportunity" provided by the IDEA con-
sisted of specialized education, including "related services" that were
specifically tailored to meet the education of the handicapped child.81
73. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994). Such related services include transportation, speech
and language pathology, audiology, psychological service, physical therapy, and social work services.
See id.
74. See Osborne, supra note 72, at I.
75. See Barkoff, supra note 47, at 137. See generally Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S.
883 (1984).
76. See Allan Osborne, Where Will the Supreme Court Draw the Line Between Medical and
School Health Services Under the IDEA?, 128 EDuc. LAW REP. 559, 560-61 (1998); see also Tatro, 468
U.S. at 890.
77. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
78. See generally Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). The Court agreed that an
interpreter was not necessary because without assistance from a sign language interpreter, the student
was performing better than most students. See id. at 210.
79. See id. at 198.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 200. The Court supported this view based upon a combined view of the congres-
sional intention found via the legislative history and the language of the IDEA itself. See id. at 201
n.23. The Court further supported this view with language found in the associated senate report that
concluded that handicapped children excluded from public education became dependents, thereby
costing taxpayers billions; however with proper educational services, many of these individuals would
2000]
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In 1984, the Court again addressed issues pertaining to the IDEA in
Tatro when the Supreme Court addressed whether clean intermittent
catheterization (CIC) constituted a "related service" within the IDEA's
provisions, thereby requiring the school district to provide such ser-
vices.82 Amber Tatro was an eight-year-old child born with spina bifida,
which resulted in orthopedic impairments, speech impairments, and a
neurogenic bladder.83 As a consequence of having a neurogenic blad-
der, Amber required CIC, a procedure involving the insertion of a
catheter into the urethra to drain the urine stored in the bladder. 84 Since
the procedure is fairly simple, only requiring an hour of training for a
layperson, Amber's parents, babysitter, and teenage brother were trained
to perform the technique.85
Due to Amber's special needs, an individualized education program
was developed, which included provisions for special services such
as physical and occupational therapy; however, no provisions were
made for the school to perform the CIC during school hours. 86 The
plaintiffs invoked the IDEA, arguing that since the state was receiving
federal funding under the statute, it was consequently mandated to pro-
vide the child with a "free appropriate public education" including the
appropriate "related services." 87
The district court in Tatro concluded that CIC was not a "related
service" under the IDEA "because it did not serve a need arising from
the effort to educate." 88 However, the court of appeals reversed, holding
that the CIC was a "related service" because unless provided, Amber
would be denied the opportunity to attend and benefit from the special
education.8 9 Consequently, the court remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with its ruling.90
Upon remand, the school district emphasized the IDEA's provision,
which states that "'medical services' could qualify as 'related services'
only when they served the purpose of diagnosis or evaluation." 91 The
increase their independence and consequently reduce their dependence on society. See id. (citing S.
REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433). Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that the references in the legislative history indicated Congress' intention that the services
provided to handicapped children be educationally beneficial despite the nature or severity of the
handicap that child may have. See id.
82. See Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 890 (1984).
83. See id. at 885.
84. See id. This procedure must be performed every three to four hours to avoid kidney damage.
See id.
85. See id. The Court also noted that in the future Amber could perform her own catheterization.
See id.
86. See id. at 886.
87. See id. at 886 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(17), 1412(1), 1414(a)(l)(C)(ii) (1982)).
88. Id. at 887.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id. The district court observed that the procedure could be performed under Texas law by a
[VOL. 76:385
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district court held that because the service did not require administration
by a physician, a layperson could be trained to execute the procedure,
the service was not a "medical service" within the meaning of the
IDEA.92 Instead, the service was characterized as a "related service"
within the IDEA's provisions. 9 3 As a result, the school board was
ordered to provide these "related services" during school hours.9 4
After the court of appeals affirmed this decision, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 95
The issue addressed by the Supreme Court, in Tatro, was whether
the IDEA required the school district to provide Amber with CIC services
during the school day. 96 The Tatro Court analyzed the governing statute
and concluded that districts receiving the federal funding were required
to implement a policy assuring that handicapped children have a right to
free appropriate public education, which is explicitly defined via the
IDEA's statutory language as "special education and related ser-
vices." 97 Therefore, the decision in Tatro hinged on whether Amber's
CIC was a "related service" within the meaning of the IDEA.98
In analyzing this question, the Court determined that it must first
decide whether CIC was a "supportive service" required by the IDEA to
facilitate a handicapped child in benefiting from the special education
provided. 99 Second, the Court determined that it must decide whether
the CIC was excluded from this "supportive service" definition because
it met the "medical service" exclusion, which required that the district
only provide medical services for diagnosis or evaluation purposes.OO
In applying the facts of Amber's situation, the Court held that her
CIC was clearly a supportive service, because without such services she
would be unable to attend school and benefit from the special educa-
tion.101 Furthermore, the Court explained that services enabling a child
to attend school are no different than those services expressly stated in
nurse or other qualified individual "without engaging in the unauthorized practice of medicine." Id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 887-88.
95. See id at 888.
96. See id. at 888-89. The Court also addressed whether the respondents could obtain relief
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in addition to relief obtained under the IDEA; however, the
Court ruled that section 504 is inapplicable when remedial relief is obtainable under the IDEA. See id
at 895 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1994). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act authorizes the prevailing
party in an action to recover attorney's fees, which the IDEA does not specifically outline. See id. at
888 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1994)).
97. Id. at 889 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(18), 1412(1), 1414(a)(l)(C)(ii) (1982)).
98. See id. at 890.
99. See id.
100. See id
101. See id "A [supportive] service that enables a handicapped child to remain at school during
the day is an important means of providing the child with the meaningful access to education that
Congress envisioned." Id. at 891.
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the "related services" definition, such as transportation to and from the
school building.10 2
Next, the Court in Tatro proceeded to the second step of its analysis
by addressing the "medical services" exclusion provided within the
Act. 103 As specified in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17), a school district is only
required to provide medical services for the purposes of diagnosis or
evaluation.10 4 In interpreting this provision, the Court held that defer-
ence should be paid to the controlling regulations of the Department of
Education.105 Under these regulations, the term "related services"
includes "school health services," which in turn is defined as "services
provided by qualified school nurse or other qualified person."
106
"Medical services" are defined as "services provided by a licensed
physician to determine a child's medically related handicapping con-
dition which results in the child's need for special education and related
services."107 In interpreting these statutes, the Tatro Court concluded
that the only "medical services" required under the statutory language
were services provided by a licensed physician for diagnosis of a child's
handicapped condition.108
However, the school district indicated that CIC was a "medical
service," even though it was not exclusively performed by a physi-
cian. 109 The school board based this view on Texas law, which confined
CIC to "uses in accordance with a physician's prescription and under a
physician's ultimate supervision."110 In reviewing this argument, the
Court ultimately concluded that such an interpretation was contradictory
to the IDEA's language and legislative history."'l The Court stated that
the Department of Education's regulations defined "related services" to
include school health related services, which were in turn defined as
services that could be provided either by a school nurse or other
qualified personnel. 1 ' 2 The Court relied upon the fact that Congress
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1982)).
105. See id at 891-92 (citing Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982)).
106. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(a), (b)(10) (1983)).
107. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(4)).
108. See id. at 891.
109. See id. at 893.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 893-94. The Court further noted several limitations that it indicated should min-
imize the burden the school district fears: first, to be entitled to related services, a child must be
handicapped so as to require special education; second, only those services necessary for the child to
benefit from special education are required; and third, only services that can be performed by a nurse
or layperson are required, which excludes those services that must be performed by a physician. See
id at 894.
112. See id. at 892.
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specifically excluded "medical services" in its definition of "related
services"; the Court further supported this analysis with the Secretary of
Education's "permissible construction" of the "medical service" ex-
clusion, which limited the "medical services" exclusion to those services
of a physician.113
Tatro was the first major decision by the Supreme Court addressing
the "related services" language found within the IDEA.114 Following
this decision, additional cases interpreted the "related services" lan-
guage and the Supreme Court's application.11 5 That same year, in
Department of Education v. Katherine D.,116 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a homebound program for a, child suffering from
cystic fibrosis was not within the "free appropriate public education"
under the IDEA, because the state could provide the child with trained
staff members to administer medical services needed in order for the
child to attend regular public school. 117 The court of appeals held that
the services the child required could clearly be provided by a trained
layperson; consequently, it held that such services fell squarely within the
requirements of the IDEA.118
In addition to Katherine D., a subsequent opinion pertaining to the
language of "related services" within the IDEA was Detsel v. Board of
Education, "19 decided in 1986.120 In Detsel, the plaintiff brought an
action on behalf of her daughter Melissa, seeking relief under the Educa-
tion of All Handicapped Children Act, a title amended to the IDEA in
1990.121 Melissa suffered from severe disabilities and required an
assistant to provide the services needed for her survival. 122
The issue before the district court was whether the school district
was required to furnish a nursing attendant to provide Melissa with the
113. See id.
114. See Barkoff, supra note 47, at 136 (discussing the Supreme Court's initial consideration of
the scope of the health-related services provision).
115. See Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1983).
116. 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cit. 1983).
117. See Katherine D., 727 F.2d at 815-16.
118. See id. at 815 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(10) (1982)). Because of her condition, the child
had a tracheotomy tube, which was placed in her trachea to allow her to breathe and expel mucus
secretions. See id. at 812. In order for the child to attend classes, the staff would need to be trained in
administering her medication, suctioning her lungs, and reinserting her tracheotomy tube should it
become dislodged. See id.
119. 637 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987).
120. See Detsel v. Board of Educ., 637 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 587 (2d
Cir. 1987).
121. See id.
122. See id. at 1024. Such services included continuous respiratory assistance, monitoring of
vital signs, administration of medication into the intestine, the ability to perform cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation, and pulmonary therapy. See id.
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necessary services that would enable her to attend classes. 123 As in Tatro,
the controversy hinged upon the distinction between supportive or "re-
lated services" and "medical services" within the IDEA.124 The defen-
dants argued that the services were not a "related service" within the
meaning of the IDEA because they were still medical in nature and there-
fore excluded under 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17).1 25 The defendants urged
the court to ignore the language found in the Department of Education
regulations, which excluded therapeutic services performed by a physi-
cian but required those services if they could be performed by a non-
physician.126 Instead of determining whether the service was required
based upon the nature of the administrator, the defendants urged the
court to consider the nature of the services. 127
In addressing these arguments, the district court referred to the
Supreme Court's position in Tatro and performed the two-step inquiry
to determine whether such services were required. 128 First, the district
court ruled that the services were "undoubtedly" supportive, because
they would enable the child to remain in school. 129 However, the district
court interpreted the Supreme Court's analysis in Tatro as considering
the extent and nature of the services required.130
Since Melissa's required care was complicated and required skilled
health professionals, the district court indicated that the Tatro decision
had not considered such extensive circumstances and concluded that
Congress intended to "spare the school from an obligation to provide a
service that might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the range of
their competence." 131 Noting that the services at issue in this case were
not a simple procedure, such as the CIC at issue in Tatro, a procedure
that could be self-performed, the court concluded that the services
instead resembled the "medical services" specifically excluded by 20
U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) of the EAHCA,132 later renamed IDEA.
123. See id. at 1025. There was a question pertaining to whether the services were "health
services" that could be provided by a school nurse or whether they were services that could be
excluded from the definition of related services by qualifying as "medical services" required for
reasons other than diagnosis or evaluation. See id.
124. See id at 1025-26.
125. See id. at 1025.
126. See id
127. See id
128. See id at 1026 (citing Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984)).
129. See id. This is the first step of the analysis enunciated by the Supreme Court in Tatro. See
468 U.S. at 891.
130. See Detsel v. Board of Ed., 637 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 587
(2d Cir. 1987). See generally Tatro, 468 U.S. 883.
131. Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1026 (quoting Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892).
132. See id. at 1027. The district court analyzed the dicta from Tatro and concluded that Con-
gress did not intend to burden school districts with having to provide extensive medical services that
were costly and complicated. See id. The district court interpreted the regulations governing 20
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In its concluding remarks, the district court held that the IDEA did
not require a school district to provide continuous in-school nursing care
to a handicapped child. 133 The court relied upon Congress' concern in
promulgating the "medical services" exclusion to avoid placing exces-
sive costs and burdens of health care on the school district.134 The
application of "simple nursing services" did not burden the schools
in the same manner that "medical services" or extensive and costly
nursing services would; therefore, the district court held that 20 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(17) permits the exclusion of such burdensome continuous
nursing services. 135 Even though the services at hand did not fulfill the
"physician" requirement enunciated in 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(4), "the
exclusion of the disputed services is in keeping with its spirit."136 The
court reasoned that Tatro meant "simple" nursing services were not
excluded as "medical service," but extensive and costly nursing services
were excluded within the spirit of the language and the intent of
Congress. 137
Melissa's mother then appealed this ruling by the district court, but
the appellate court concluded that the complaint was properly dis-
missed. 138 In her argument, Melissa's mother relied upon the previously
discussed decision from Katherine D., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision which ordered a school board to provide the requested nursing
services. 139 In contrasting the facts in Katherine D., the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that the former case required only intermittent
care that did not demand the level of expertise needed to administer the
services required by Melissa; therefore, the court reaffirmed the dismissal
of her complaint. 140
In 1995, Neely v. Rutherford County Schooll4l provided further
interpretation of the IDEA by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Samantha Neely suffered from a condition that caused severe breathing
difficulties resulting in reliance upon a tracheostomy to assist with her
respiratory efforts. 142 Because of her condition, she required constant
U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) to mean that the provision of school nursing services did not fall within the
medical services exclusion; rather, Congress decided to exclude "costly and complicated services."





137. See it See generally Tatro. 468 U.S. 883.
138. See Detsel v. Board of Educ., 820 F.2d 587, 588 (2d Cir. 1987).
139. See it
140. See id. The court of appeals' decision was only one page in length and concluded that the
controlling factor in whether the services were required rested upon the fact that they were
continuous services requiring administration by a trained professional versus intermittent services that
could be provided by a trained layperson. See id.
141. 68 F.3d 965 (6th Cir. 1995).
142. See Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining that a tra
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monitoring of her respiratory status, suctioning as frequently as every
twenty minutes when suffering from a cold, and emergency breathing
assistance with medical equipment designed to administer oxygen when
needed. 143
The Neelys petitioned the school board to provide a licensed profes-
sional, such as a registered nurse or respiratory care technician, to
provide Samantha's care during the school year.144 After agreeing to
provide such services, the school board hired a nursing assistant, to which
the family objected because they had requested a more highly trained
provider. 145 The issue then became whether the district was required
under the IDEA to provide a full-time nurse to attend to the child's
needs during school hours.146 The district court concluded that the
requested services "were supportive services that the IDEA required...
[which] were not medical services excluded under the Act."147 Subse-
quently, Rutherford County School Board filed an appeal. 148-
The appellate court enunciated the issue as whether the requested
services were a "related service" under 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) and
determined that the analysis pattern set forth in Tatro was controlling. 149
However, the court held that Tatro is "subject to several interpreta-
tions."'150 First, it may be read as adopting a "bright-line" rule that
requires any "medical service" that could be administered by a non-
physician provider as outside the scope of the "medical services" excep-
tion. 151 This would result in the school board being required to furnish
such services, because a non-physician could administer them. 152 How-
ever, the court noted that most jurisdictions have rejected "such a per se
rule." 153 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the proper
cheostomy is a procedure in which a hole is cut in the throat into which a tube is inserted to assist with
breathing).
143. See id. The court explained that Samantha required a well-trained individual to handle
emergency situations and to provide her with the needed attention her condition required. See id
144. See id. at 968.
145. See id. Samantha's parents objected to the district hiring a nursing assistant because under
Tennessee law, the requested care must be provided by a physician, registered practical nurse,
licensed practical nurse, respiratory care specialist, the patient's relatives, or the patient herself. See
id. at 970 (citing TNN. CODE. ANN. §§ 63-6-402, 63-6-410 (1982)).
146. See id. at 968.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 969 (citing Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 890 (1984)).
150. Id. at 970. See generally Tatro, 468 U.S. 883.
151. See Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 970 (6th Cit. 1995); see also Macomb
County Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Joshua, 715 F. Supp. 824, 828 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (reading Tatro to
stand for the proposition that all health services not performed by a licensed physician are related
services required by the IDEA regardless of whether or not they are costly and burdensome).
152. See Neely, 68 F.3d at 967. This "bright-line" rule is also often referred to as the
"physician/non-physician" test. See Barkoff, supra note 47, at 155 n.160.
153. Neely, 68 F.3d at 970; see also Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. 1020, 1027 (D.
Utah 1992); Bevin H. v. Wright, 666 F. Supp. 71, 75 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Detsel v. Board. of Educ., 637 F.
Supp. 1022, 1026-27 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (reading Tatro to stand for services required by a physician
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interpretation of Tatro was "that a school district is not required to
provide every service which is 'medical in nature."
154
Instead of focusing upon the financial cost of the requested services,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals focused upon the "inherently bur-
densome" nature of the care requested.155 The court agreed that
services characterized as "intensive," "time-consuming," "life-
threatening," and "expensive" did not fall within the requirements of
the IDEA.156 In summary, the appellate court concluded that the district
court was in error because, "[R]equiring a school to hire a licensed
practical nurse to care for one child is 'inherently burdensome' and,
undoubtedly, distinguishable from Tatro."
157
In summary, these previous lower court decisions illustrate the
development of a clear split among the circuits regarding the interpreta-
tion of the "related services" provision under the IDEA.158 This split
led to the Supreme Court granting certiorari to an Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals case, thereby giving the Court an opportunity to address the
inconsistent application of its 1984 Tatro decision.
159
III. ANALYSIS
In Garret F., a seven-to-two decision authored by Justice Stevens,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision.160 The Court addressed the two interpretations sur-
rounding the "related services" provision, clearly adopted the bright-
other than for diagnostic and evaluation purposes are excluded, but simple nursing procedures are not
excluded), afrd, 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987).
154. Neely, 68 F.3d at 971. See generally Tatro, 468 U.S. 883.
155. Neely, 68 F.3d at 971. The court differentiated the care required in the case at hand, which
required one-on-one services, with the intermittent care required in Tatro. See id. at 972.
156. Id. (citing Wright, 666 F. Supp. at 75).
157. Id. at 972. The court refused to address the financial issue of hiring a licensed practical
nurse versus hiring a nursing assistant; instead, it based its reasoning upon the inherently burdensome
nature of the services that the individual hired would provide. See id. The court held that the undue
burden involved in this matter derived not from the salary of the professional hired to administer the
care, but instead involved the extensive nature of the care that was required by the child. See id.
158. See Osborne, supra note 72, at 10. See generally Tatro, 468 U.S. 883.
159. See Osborne, supra note 72, at 10.
160. See Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 79 (1999). Justice
Stevens delivered the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
Justice Scalia, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. See id. at 68-79. Justice Thomas
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kennedy joined. See id. at 79-85.
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line test, and abrogated the multi-factor analysis. 16 1 The Court held
thatcontinuous nursing services were "related services" that the school
district was required to provide under the IDEA.162
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court noted that the IDEA was enacted in part "to
assure that all children with disabilities have available to them.., a free
appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs." 163 The Court
explained that the IDEA authorizes federal funding for states providing
disabled children with special education and necessary "related ser-
vices." 164 The Court faced the issue of whether the definition of
"related services" in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) "require[d] a public
school district in a participating State to provide a ventilator-dependent
student with certain nursing services during school hours." 165
The Court began its discussion of the pertinent language by stating
that "the IDEA's definition of 'related services', our decision in ...
Tatro ... and the overall statutory scheme all support the decision of the
Court of Appeals."' 166 Instead of restricting the applicability of the
"related services" definition, the Court concluded that it should
"broadly encompass" the supportive services needed by a child in order
to allow the child to benefit from special education. 167 The Court agreed
with both parties in asserting that there was no dispute that the requested
161. See id. at 72-78.
162. See id. at 79. With this decision, the Court abrogated the test used in both Neely and Detsel
because the analysis did not include the use of the "bright-line" test to determine whether nursing
services were required under the related services provision. See generally Garret F., 526 U.S. 66;
Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1995); Detsel v. Board of Educ. 820 F.2d
587 (2d Cir. 1987).
163. Garret F., 526 U.S. at 68 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994)).
164. See id (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(18), 1412(1) (1994)).
165. Garret F., 526 U.S. at 68-69.
The term "related services" means transportation, and such developmental, corrective,
and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological
services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation,
social work services, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, and
medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and
evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit
from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling
conditions in children.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994). "Related services" was not defined at the time of the enactment of
the Education of the Handicapped Act. See Garret F., 526 U.S. at 69 n.1 (citing Education of the
Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970)). However, in 1975 Congress added the
language at issue in this case, which has not been amended since its adoption. See ia (citing Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 4(a)(4), 89 Stat. 773, 775).




services were in fact "supportive," because without them the child would
be unable to remain in school.16
8
Next, the Court noted that the definition of "related services"
included only those "medical services" that are for diagnostic and
evaluation purposes.169 However, the Court relied upon a previous inter-
pretation of this language given in its Tatro decision, which stated that
"medical services" included only those services which must be provided
by a physician.170 Even though the Court referenced the cost of the ser-
vices and the competence of school staff as justifications for distinguish-
ing between physician services and services of others, the Court clearly
reinforced the principle that there is an unmistakable line between the
two. 171 The phrase "medical services" is expressly limited only to those
services provided by a physician, and it does not encompass other
"related services" that can be provided by a qualified school nurse or
other qualified person.172 The Court then supported this conclusion by
stating that even though Garret's services are more extensive in nature,
they are "no more 'medical' than was the care sought in Tatro."
173
The Court completely rejected the school district's proposal of a
multi-factor test that would have included consideration of the following
elements: (1) whether the care was continuous or intermittent, (2)
whether the school personnel currently in place could administer such
care, (3) the cost of providing such services, and (4) potential conse-
quences that could occur if the care was improperly administered. 174 In
refusing to adopt such a test, the Court held that there is no legal authori-
ty to support such a proposition, preferring instead the "bright-line"
test that clearly limits the "medical services" exception to those services
provided by a physician.175 The district's financial concerns in provid-
ing for such continuous one-on-one services would have been a factor
had the Court adopted the proposed multi-factor analysis.176 Instead, the
168. See id. (indicating that Congress' intention was for the handicapped child to have meaning-
ful access to public education).
169. See id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17)). The statute contains no further explanatory
definition of "medical services" exempted from the coverage related services requirement. See id.
170. See id. at 73-74 (quoting Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892-94).
171. See id.
172. See id. The Court clearly adopted the plain meaning of the governing regulations setting
forth the definition of medical services as those strictly provided by a physician. See id. at 75 n.6
(citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(4) (1983)). Furthermore, the Secretary of Education advocated such an
interpretation of this regulation and supported the affirmation of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
judgment. See Brief for the United States at 8-9, Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526
U.S. 66 (1999) (No. 96-1793).
173. Garret F., 526 U.S. at 75.
174. See Petitioner's Brief at 11, Garret F. (No. 96-1793).
175. See Garret F., 526 U.S. at 75-76. The Court favors this standard because it is a "generally
workable interpretation of the statute." See id. at 76.
176. See id. at 77. At oral argument the school district proposed that first the Court consider the
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Court ruled that its role was not to analyze financial concerns, but rather
to interpret existing law.177 The Court specifically noted that neither the
"related services" nor the excluded "medical services" definitions
played a role in a cost analysis.178  Therefore, including financial
concerns in its analysis of the governing statutes would "require [the
Court] to engage in judicial lawmaking without any guidance from
Congress."179
The Court concluded by stating that the case at hand involved the
assurance of meaningful access to public schools.IS0 Consequently, in
order for Garret to have such "meaningful access," the district must
provide the necessary "related services" as prescribed under the
statutory language, precedent, and the IDEA purposes.' 8 '
B. JUSTICE THOMAS' DISSENT
Justice Thomas, joined in his dissenting opinion by Justice Ken-
nedy, concluded that the majority relied too heavily on its decision in
Tatro.l8 2 He argued that the Court should not have adhered to the
principles formulated in its Tatro decision because they could not be
reconciled with the explicit language of the IDEA. 183 He disagreed with
the majority's interpretation of the statutory language, arguing that their
interpretation of the IDEA was contrary to Congress' intent by relying
on the rules of statutory construction and he also addressed issues of
federalism pertaining to Spending Clause legislation. 8 4
First, Justice Thomas pointed out that the holding of Tatro was con-
trary to the plain meaning of the statutory language found in the IDEA;
furthermore, he stated that the majority's reliance on the promulgated
nature of the requested service (either "medical" or not); afterwards, if the service is medical then the
district asserted that the multi-factor test should be applied to determine whether it is an excluded
physician services or an included school nursing service. See id. at 76 n.8.
177. See id. at 77.
178. See id.
179. Id. In addition, the Court noted that an analysis of financial considerations would result in
conflicts with the overall purpose of the IDEA. See id. The majority noted that the objections from
the dissent regarding the Court's unanimous opinion in Tatro is 15 years too late. See id at 78 n.10.
The majority stated that the dissent cited unrelated provisions and offered a "circular" definition of
"medical services." Id. Furthermore, the majority noted that the dissent relied upon the possibility that
an application of this rule might result in the need for additional staffing; however, the majority noted
that "an additional staffing need is generally not a sufficient objection for the requirements of [20
U.S.C.] § 1401(a)(17)." Id.
180. See id. at 79.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 79 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See generally Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468
U.S. 883 (1984).
183. See Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 79. Justice Thomas said
that the majority extended the Tatro decision too far, ignoring constitutionally mandated rules of
construction. See id.
184. See id. at 79, 84.
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regulations by the Department of Education was "misplaced."' 8 5 In-
stead, he urged that the text of the IDEA expressly stated "that school
districts are not required to provide "medical services," except for diag-
nostic and evaluation purposes."' 186 Specifically, Justice Thomas ques-
tioned the majority's lack of explanation in reasoning that services
which are medical in nature do not fall within the "medical services"
exception.187 For example, he noted that the majority rejected an inter-
pretation of the term "medical services" that was consistent with usage
in other components of the federal law.1 88 Instead of focusing on the
nature of the services, he stated that the majority incorrectly focused
upon the provider of such services.
189
Justice Thomas further concluded that such an encompassing
interpretation of the IDEA was contrary to Congress' intent.190 He
stated that "Congress enacted IDEA to increase the educational oppor-
tunities available to disabled children, not to provide medical care for
them." 19 1 To support his argument, Justice Thomas pointed to the
language of the IDEA, noting that Congress decided to include sup-
portive services that appeared medical in nature by expressly providing
for them in the definition. 192
Justice Thomas also attacked the majority ruling based upon special
rules of statutory construction. 193 For example, in order for Congress to
place conditions upon the receipt of federal funding, "it must do so
185. See id. at 80. Justice Thomas noted that the majority should have first asked whether the
statutory language clearly showed Congress' intent before turning to the Department of Education's
regulations, because if the intent is clear there should be no focus on the implementing regulations.
See id. See generally Tatro, 468 U.S. 883.
186. Garret F., 526 U.S. at 80 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994)).
187. See id. at 81.
188. See id Justice Thomas argued that the majority rejected the use of the term "medical serv-
ices" that is otherwise consistent with its use in other areas of federal law, such as for federal income
tax purposes. See id. He cites a definition of the term "medical services" found in the statute that
includes not only medical examination but also rehabilitative services, preventive health services, and
mental health services. See id. at 81 n.2 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1701(6) (1994)).
189. See id. For example, Justice Thomas explained that the term "food service" is not thought
of exclusively as being provided by a chef. See id.
190. See id at 82.
191. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994)).
192. See id. The statutory definition of related "services" specifically includes in its language
services that appear medical in nature such as speech pathology, occupational therapy, and audiology.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994).
193. See Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 82-83 (1999). Justice
Thomas noted that the Department of Education never promulgated regulations defining the scope of
the IDEA's medical services provision; instead it had only defined those medical services that are
owed to handicapped children, not those that are not owed. See id. Justice Thomas argued that the
majority in Tatro "extrapolated" from this regulation "that 'medical services' not owed under the
statute are those 'services by a licensed physician' that serve other purposes." Id. at 83 (citing Irving
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 892 n.10 (1984)). He contends that the majority did not defer
to the regulation itself, but instead relied upon an inference drawn from it that speculates about how a
"regulation might read if the Department of Education promulgated one." Id.
40520001
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unambiguously."1 94 He relied upon precedent holding that a state
receiving federal funding must knowingly accept the term of the "con-
tract"; otherwise, if Spending Clause legislation was interpreted broadly,
the states would be "saddled" with unanticipated obligations.1
95
Instead of reading Tatro broadly, Justice Thomas proposed a more
narrow reading that requires school districts to provide disabled children
with health-related services, which can be provided by school nurses as
part of their normal duties.196 He reasoned that such a conservative
reading is more consistent with the Court's "obligation to interpret
Spending Clause legislation narrowly" and, therefore, avoids saddling
the states with fiscal obligations not necessarily anticipated.1
97
In conclusion, Justice Thomas argued that full-time nursing services
are "medical services," which should therefore be excluded under the
IDEA's "medical services" provision. 198 He justified his arguments on
two main premises: Tatro was wrongly decided, which in turn meant
that the majority's rulings in that decision should not be further ex-
tended in Garret F., and Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant to the
Spending Clause, which therefore requires a narrow interpretation of the
legislation's text.199
IV. IMPACT
In Garret F., the United States Supreme Court settled the issue
surrounding the extent and nature of "related services" that are re-
quired under the IDEA.200 In so ruling, the Court clearly abrogated the
continued use of a multi-factor test in determining whether services
requested under the umbrella of the IDEA are required. 201 Instead of
analyzing the decision of whether a school district is required to perform
the requested services using a multi-factor analysis, including such ele-
ments as expenses or the inherently burdensome nature of the requested
194. Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
195. See id. (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17). Justice Thomas cited the Court's previous ruling
that the legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the Spending Clause must rest upon whether
the state voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the "contract" formed between the
government and a state when it accepts federal funds. See id
196. See id. at 84-85.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. See Deborah Rebore & Perry Zirkel, The Supreme Court's Latest Special Education Ruling:
A Costly Decision?, 135 EDUC. LAW REP. 331, 337 (1999) (explaining the dissenting opinion in Garret
F.).
200. See Osborne, supra note 72, at 1-2.
201. See Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 75 (1999). The Court




service, the decision must be based upon the nature of the provider.202 If
such services can be performed by a "qualified school nurse or other
qualified person," then the school board must provide such services
despite the potential cost, the extensive nature, and regardless of whether
the services are medical in nature. 203 Because of the costs involved in
providing such full-time nursing services, this decision will have
"far-reaching implications for public school districts."204
School district officials and their representatives have already ex-
pressed concern regarding the costs that will be involved in providing
such continuous nursing services. 205 There is disagreement among the
courts as to whether or not such services place an excessive burden upon
the school districts. 206 For example, such lower court decisions as Detsel
and Neely determined that the costs would be too burdensome, yet the
Supreme Court concluded in Garret F. that such services are not
excessive as the law is currently written. 207 Some argue expenditures for
continuous nursing services will reduce the amount of funds available
for the remainder of the children, thus reducing the overall quality of
education they receive. 208  Yet others argue it is unlikely that most
school districts will feel any financial impact from this decision, because
the number of children requiring such services is 10w. 209
This potential impact is further illustrated by the petitioner's argu-
ment in Garret F. that the Supreme Court's decision will financially
saddle the school district with an obligation which the current staff of
school nurses cannot provide. 210 The school district argued that even if
202. See id. at 76 & n.8. The Court stated that its endorsement of the physician bright-line test is
"unmistakable." See id. at 74. The Court went on to say, "It is thus settled that the phrase 'medical
services' ... does not embrace all forms of care that might loosely be described as 'medical' in other
contexts .... " Id. at 74-75. If the care required is intermittent and could be provided by the school
nurse, courts have generally held that such services fall within the "related services" provision. See
Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984); Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d
809 (9th Cir. 1983); Macomb County Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Joshua S., 715 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (holding that if the care is intermittent and can be administered by the school nurse, such
services fall within the "related services" provision and requirements of the IDEA). But see Neely v.
Rutherford County Sch. Dist., 68 F.3d 965 (6th Cir. 1995); Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F.
Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992) (holding that where requested services are continuous in nature, the courts
have held that the service was an excludable medical service under the IDEA); Detsel v. Board of
Educ., 637 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987).
203. See Garret F., 526 U.S. at 75 n.6 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(10) (1983)).
204. Osborne, supra note 72, at 2.
205. See Osborne, supra note 72, at 13.
206. See Osborne, supra note 72, at 13-14.
207. See Osborne, supra note 72, at 13-14. See generally Neely, 68 F.3d 965; Detsel, 637 F.
Supp. 1022.
208. See Osborne, supra note 72, at 14.
209. See Rebore & Zirkel, supra note 199, at 338 (estimating that only 2,000 children under the
age of 22 require such extensive services and stating that others estimate that the number is closer to
17,000).
210. See Petitioner's Brief at 6, Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66
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the provider of Garret's services performed both his "medical services"
and educational services that were previously being administered by an
educational associate, the additional cost incurred by the school district
would be between $20,000 to $30,000.211 In enacting the IDEA in 1975,
Congress made a commitment to provide participating states with "40%
of the national average per pupil expenditure for each eligible child"
that could be used to defray the costs of educating the disabled
students. 2 12 However, funding for the program has not exceeded twelve
percent. 213
There may also be future issues and implications surrounding
federalism and the Spending Clause, as Justice Thomas indicated in his
dissenting opinion. 2 14  For example, the school district in Garret F.
argued that if Congress intended to burden the states with providing ex-
pensive individualized nursing services, then such a requirement should
come directly from Congress. 215 Some argue that a series of cases under
the Spending Clause, including Garret F., have afforded Congress
greater authority at the expense of local education. 216 The argument is
made that the proper result in Garret F., consistent with federalism
concerns, should have been to require school nurses to perform services
consistent with their current normal duties. 217 This would have lightened
the burden placed on schools and would have been consistent with
Spending Clause jurisprudence, because the school districts would have
been aware of exactly what they were "contracting" for when accepting
federal funds.218
In North Dakota, the legislature has specifically stated that "State
special education policies are directed to achieving the purposes set out
(1999) (No. 96-1793).
211. See id. at 6-7. The district would be required to hire an additional staff member to provide
Garret's services because the district currently has six full-time registered nurses who are fulfilling
other duties. See id. at 6-7.
212. Brief for National School Boards Association at 26-27, Garret F. (No. 96-1793).
213. See id. at 27 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, JUSTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
ESTIMATE TO CON-GRESS FISCAL YEAR 1993 (1992)).
214. See Garret F., 526 U.S. at 83-84. Justice Thomas argued that in requiring states to provide
such extensive services, the majority imposed a burden upon the states that Congress did not intend,
thereby violating the Spending Clause. See id. at 84.
215. See Petitioner's Brief at 20, Garret F. (No. 96-1793). The school district supported this
argument with evidence that the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that if Congress intends to
condition the receipt of federal funds, such conditions must be unambiguous. See id. (citing New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 172 (1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
216. See Dennis Cariello, Note, Federalism for the New Millennium: Accounting for the Values
of Federalism, 26 FoRDHAMURB. L.J. 1493, 1552-53 (1999). Cariello argues that there is a current
trend toward favoring congressional authority over the states, as evidenced by a series of recent cases
under the Spending Clause that have afforded Congress greater authority. See id. at 1552. Such an
increase in national authority, he states, has come at the expense of local concerns, including
education. See id.
217. See id. at 1554.
218. See id at 1553-54.
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in the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act."219 Furthermore, the
North Dakota Century Code states that funding from the state, in addi-
tion to the federal funding supplied via the IDEA, is matched with local
funds to achieve the goals and policies of the legislature. 220
Section 15-59-02.1 of the North Dakota Century Code states the
specific intent of the legislature and the relationship of the statute with
the IDEA.221 In conjunction with this chapter, the legislature also noted
in section 15-59-05.2 of the North Dakota Century Code that inter-
agency cooperative agreements will be used to provide education-related
services to disabled students. 222 Therefore, in North Dakota, in addition
to the federal funding provided via the IDEA, state agencies such as the
state department of human services and the state department of health
are affected by the ruling in Garret F.223 This is just one example of the
broad impact that the Supreme Court's ruling in Garret F. will have on
the future of special education funding in North Dakota.
V. CONCLUSION
In Garret F., the United States Supreme Court clearly adopted the
"bright-line" test to determine whether such "related services" are re-
quired within the meaning of the IDEA.224 With the abrogation of any
multi-factor analysis in favor of a bright-line test, the Court ended fifteen
years of inconsistent application of the IDEA's "related services"
provision.225
Though the Court has resolved this interpretive issue, its decision
will undoubtedly "have far-reaching implications for public school
districts." 226 The debate has already ensued concerning where the fund-
ing will come from to support such continuous nursing services. 227
Other issues have surfaced pertaining to potential Spending Clause con-
flicts, as pointed out by Justice Thomas' dissent. 228 While more issues
will possibly surface in the future, the Supreme Court has clearly
resolved the split opinions among the circuit courts in firmly holding
219. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-59-02.1 (Supp. 1999).
220. See id.
221. See id. In addition to the provision of matching local funds, the statute provides a definition
of related services, the development of an individualized education plan, other such services
necessary to enable all student with a disability to a free appropriate public education. See id.
222. See N.D. CENT CODE § 15-59-05.2 (Supp. 1999).
223. See id.
224. See generally Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999) (adopting
"bright-line" test to determine whether requested services are required under the IDEA).
225. See Osborne, supra note 72, at 1-2.
226. Osborne, supra note 72, at 2.
227. See Osborne, supra note 76, at 569-70.
228. See Garret F., 526 U.S. at 83-84.
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that continuous nursing services are required within the provisions of the
IDEA, thereby abrogating any multi-factor cost analysis. 229 As a result,
children with disabilities who were previously precluded from attending
public school due to the extensive nature of their disability are now
afforded the opportunity to attend their local public school at the school
district's expense. 230
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229. See id. at 79.
230. See Rebore & Zirkel, supra note 199, at 341.
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